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File
with NIE10

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 February 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REVISION OF NIE-10: COMMUNIST CHINA

In paragraph 14 (c) of NIE-10 it is estimated that economic warfare and blockade coupled with limited military action consisting of aerial and naval bombardment against selected targets "would seriously reduce the military capabilities of Communist China for sustained operations, would impair the ability of the regime to maintain internal controls, and conceivably might imperil the stability of the regime itself."

We then estimated in 14 (e) that these actions supplemented by (1) support of guerrillas, (2) use of Nationalist Forces, and (3) continuation of UN operations in Korea "would imperil the Chinese Communist regime".

We omitted from NIE-10 the following statements originally contained in the NIE-10 draft of 12 January as paragraph 13: "Neither the Chinese people nor the Chinese Communist regime could be expected to remain passive after the initiation of such counter measures. These measures would undoubtedly be portrayed as proof of Kuomintang and US imperialism and

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aggression'. Those involving direct military action would be regarded as marking a transition from localized to general war on US initiative. General and open Chinese attack on all Western interests would therefore have to be expected. Not only would Chinese ties with the USSR and Chinese dependence on the USSR be strengthened, but the USSR would probably furnish increased economic aid and possibly would provide open military assistance. If the USSR did not take such US counteraction as the occasion for beginning a global conflict, the USSR would support Communist China to the extent necessary to get the US deeply involved in Asia, and at the same time exploit the fact of US involvement and Western fears of global war to play upon neutralist and defeatist sentiment in the Near East and Western Europe, and thereby divide the US from its allies."

If the effect of economic warfare and blockade coupled with aerial and naval bombardment upon the stability of the Communist regime in China is properly estimated in the statement "...and conceivably might imperil the stability of the regime itself," (14c) it does not seem to us that these actions merely by support of the guerrillas, use of Nationalist Forces and continuation of UN operations in Korea would have sufficient additional effect to justify the estimate that in

SECRET

combination these actions "would imperil the Chinese Communist regime." (14e)

We think, therefore, that NIE-10 should be revised by a new estimate in which the combined effect of all courses of action is restated in a modified form. We think that this new estimate should also include the substance of paragraph 13 in NIE-10 draft of 12 January.

- 3 -

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